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1 Introduction
Working parents of a newborn child have to give full attention to their baby and their job.
Aiming to address this double burden for working parents, most OECD countries offer parental-
leave (PL) provisions. However, while countries agree that parents of small children need
support, the design of current PL systems differs strongly across countries. The purpose of
this paper is to provide information on one key aspect of PL. We ask how PL duration affects
a working mother who has just given birth to her first child. Studying the decision to give
birth to a second child, we can provide information on the role of PL policy for higher order
births. This analysis is important for countries with fertility rates below the replacement
rate. Studying mothers’ return-to-work, post-birth employment and post-birth labor earnings,
the paper provides information how PL duration affects subsequent work careers of working
women. This analysis allows assessing to the extent to which extending parental leave facilitates
balancing work and life. Moreover, studying the effects of parental leave on both fertility
and work allows us to assess whether institutions that shape the terms of post-birth female
employment spill-over to fertility.
Our analysis is based on the Austrian PL system. Under Austrian PL rules women can
stay off work and return to the same (or a similar) job at the same employer thereafter. During
the leave they receive a flat PL benefit of 340 Euros per month. Interestingly, Austrian policy
makers implemented two major reforms of the duration of PL – an extension of PL duration
in 1990 and a reduction of PL duration in 1996. Specifically, before July 1, 1990 the maximum
duration of PL ended with the child’s first birthday. The 1990 reform extended PL until the
child’s second birthday for all children born on or after the 1st of July. The 1996 reform
partially reversed the extension granted in 1990 by taking away the last 6 months added in
1990.
These policy changes create natural experiments that allow us to assess how changes in PL
duration affect fertility decisions of a mother who has just given birth to a new-born child.
Extending PL duration affects this decision in two different ways. First, the probability of a
higher-order birth is potentially determined by the PL duration for the baby that is already
born. This is what we call the “current-child effect”. This effect is potentially important in
the Austrian context because women who give birth no later than 3.5 months after the end
of a previous PL are exempted from the work requirement and can automatically renew PL
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eligibility for the second child. Before the 1990 reform, mothers needed to give birth to a new
child within 15.5 months. Achieving such a tight spacing of children is both biologically difficult
and not desired by many parents. The 1990 reform increased this period to 27.5 months, thus
providing much broader access to automatic renewal. The 1996 reform reduced the automatic
renewal period to 21.5 months – a space between births which is biologically feasible and
potentially desired. Second, the probability of a higher-order birth is also determined by PL
duration for the baby yet to be born. This is what we call the “future-child effect”. As
PL duration directly affects the costs associated with child bearing, the future-child effect is
expected to increase fertility.
This paper also studies how PL rules affect post-birth labor market careers of a mothers
with new-born children. The 1990 extension of leave encourages a mother to stay home with
her child in the second year after birth and to substantially delay return-to-work. Future
employment and labor earnings will be affected in two ways. First, providing parents with
extended PL encourages mothers to stay off work longer and lowers employment and labor
earnings immediately after a birth. This short-run effect is mechanical and intended by policy
makers. Second, prolonged periods of absence from the workplace may lead to skill depreciation
and weaker labor market prospects after re-entering the labor market. This potential for long-
run deterioration of women’s post-birth careers is clearly not intended by policy.
While family policies in many countries are designed to support low-income (and often non-
working) women, the Austrian case is interesting because it affects working women of all income
groups. However, it is not a priori clear for which group the PL rules generate the strongest
incentives. The flat PL benefit implies that lower income parents have a higher earnings
replacement ratio. To shed light on the importance of cash transfers we look at differences
in responses between high- and low-income women. The job protection policy may be more
important for career-oriented women. This is because job protection shields working women
from future income losses due to firm-specific human capital or deferred payment contracts.
To shed light on the importance of job protection we look at differences in responses between
blue and white collar women. As firm-specific human capital and internal labor markets are
arguably more important in white collar professions, we would expect stronger responses by
white collar women.
The empirical analysis draws on a unique and very informative data set, the Austrian So-
cial Security Database (ASSD). Set up to provide information to calculate pension benefits for
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private sector employees (about 80% of Austrian employment), the ASSD collects detailed in-
formation on a woman’s earnings and employment history from employers; and it also contains
information on take-up of PL benefits and on a women’s fertility history from the point of time
she has first worked in the private sector. We extract information on PL eligible women who
gave birth to the first child observed in ASSD in periods that cover the reform, and we analyze
subsequent fertility and labor market outcomes both in the short run (three years after first
birth) and in the long run (ten years after first birth).
Our empirical analysis uncovers five key results. First, we find that the extension of PL
enacted in July 1990 had a strong impact on subsequent fertility behavior. We find that
both the current-child PL effect and the future-child PL effect are quantitatively large. In
the short run (within three years) fertility increases by 5 percentage points (15 percent) as a
result of extended leave on the current child; and by 7 percentage points (21 percent) as a
result of extending leave for the future child. Second, we find that fertility increases not only
temporarily, but that this increase persists in the long run. Among women eligible for the more
generous PL rules, three out of hundred women gave birth to an additional child within ten
years after the birth of the first child that would not have done so with short leave. While we do
not observe the completed fertility cycle of mothers, we conclude that it is quite likely that the
policy change did not only affect the timing but also the number of births. Third, we find that
most mothers exhaust the full duration of their leaves; and that return-to-work is substantially
delayed even after PL has been exhausted (by 10 percentage points in the short-run and by 3
percentage points in the long-run). Interestingly, while work experience and earnings decrease
strongly in the short run, we do not find that longer leaves have long-run effects on work
experience and cumulative earnings. Fourth, there are differential fertility responses of high-
and low-wage women and blue and white collar workers indicating that both cash transfers
and job protection have a sizeable impact on fertility and labor market responses. Fifth, we
find that the 1996 reduction of PL duration had a significant effect on the timing of subsequent
births but no impact on the number of children. The 1996 partial reversal of the extension
granted in 1990 also partially undoes the short-run reductions in employment and earnings
generated by the 1990 extension of PL duration.
This paper contributes to the literature on the impact of cash transfers on fertility behavior
(Milligan 2005; Hardoy and Schøne 2005) and to the literature on the effects of welfare reform
on fertility behavior of low income women in the U.S. (Hoynes 1997; Moffitt 1998; Rosenzweig
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1999; Kearney 2004; Joyce et al. 2004).1 Furthermore, Averett and Whittington (2001) study
the impact of Family and Medical Leave Act in 1993 on fertility. Hoem (1993) studies the
impact of PL rules (“speed premium”) for Sweden and Piketty (2003) looks at the parental
education benefits in France. This paper also contributes to the literature studying the effects
of family leave on labor market outcomes. Klerman and Leibowitz (1997, 1999) and Baum
(2003) find only weak effects on employment and wages. Berger and Waldfogel (2004) for the
U.S., Baker and Milligan (2007) for Canada, and Ruhm and Teague (1997) and Ruhm (1998)
for European countries find a closer relationship between PL provisions and the labor market
attachment of mothers. Albrecht et al. (1998) show that PL induced career interruptions are
not associated with a wage penalty for women in Sweden. Scho¨nberg and Ludsteck (2007)
study the causal effects of successive changes in PL duration on employment and earnings in
Germany.2
Our paper adds to this literature in at least four ways. First, our empirical analysis provides
convincing evidence on the effects of changing PL duration for the current child by adopting a
quasi-experimental approach. Second, our study also provides evidence on the role of changing
PL duration for the future child. Understanding these two effects is crucial in PL design. Third,
our results speak to the important issue of how policies that enhance the balance between work
life and family life affect fertility behavior. This is different from many previous papers that
have focused on the role of cash transfers for fertility. Fourth, our empirical analysis allows
assessing the effects of changes in PL both in the short- and long-run labor market outcomes
for mothers. This allows addressing the frequently raised concern that generous PL policies
will harm mothers in the long run because extended periods off work lead to depreciation of
human capital and worse future labor market prospects.3
The paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses the institutional set-up and
develops testable hypotheses how the reform might have affected fertility and labor market
behavior. Section 3 discusses the data and presents our empirical strategy designed to measure
the effects of PL duration for the current child and PL duration for the future child. Section
1Bjo¨rklund (2007) provides a recent survey on recent empirical work of the impact of family policies on
fertility.
2Several recent papers study the effects of parental leave or child care on child development (Baker and
Milligan 2008; Baker, Gruber, and Milligan 2008; Dustmann and Scho¨nberg 2008). A further related literature
analyzes the impact of financial incentives on fertility and labor supply using a structural approach. See Moffitt
(1984) for an early approach to this question and Laroque and Salanie (2005) for a more recent study of the
effects of financial transfers on fertility and labor supply.
3In a companion paper, we discuss how the two Austrian reforms affect the quality of mothers’ first post-
birth job (Lalive and Zweimu¨ller 2007). The analysis of the current paper is more comprehensive in providing
a detailed assessment of the overall effects of PL on earnings and employment on all post-birth jobs.
5
4 presents the fertility and labor market effects of the increase in PL duration for the current
child enacted with the 1990 reform. Section 5 studies the effect of the 1990 increase in PL
duration for the future child. Section 6 analyzes the impact of the 1996 reform, and section 7
concludes with a discussion of the relevance of our findings.
2 Background and hypotheses
This section provides the institutional background on the Austrian PL system and discusses
how two reforms in the 1990s may affect higher-order fertility and work careers of mothers.
2.1 The Austrian PL system in the 1990s
Working women have access to two types of family policies in Austria: maternity leave and
parental leave. Maternity leave lasts for sixteen weeks (eight weeks before and eight weeks
after the actual birth) and pays the average wage rate over the last quarter prior to the birth.
Before July 1990, PL started after maternity leave ended and lasted until the child’s first
birthday. To become eligible for PL a mother had to satisfy a work requirement. Women
taking up PL for the first time had to have worked (and paid social security contributions) for
at least 52 weeks during the two years prior to birth or be eligible for unemployment benefits
– again fulfilling a work requirement of 52 out the two years prior to entering unemployment.
For mothers with at least one previous take-up of PL or first-time mothers below the age of
twenty years the work requirement is reduced to twenty weeks of employment during the last
year prior to birth. Moreover, PL is also renewed if the mother gives birth within a “grace
period” that extends up to four months after the end of an earlier leave.4
PL provisions are twofold. On the one hand, PL protects the previous job. A mother has
the right to return to her previous employer until PL ends. Moreover, she can not be dismissed
during the first four weeks after returning to work.5 On the other hand, PL is associated with
4The exact legal definition of the length of the “grace period” is that the work requirement is also abandoned
if a new maternity protection period starts within a grace period of six weeks after the formal termination of
a previous PL. Because maternity protection starts about eight weeks before the due date, the rules effectively
imply that eligibility to PL is renewed for any new child expected to be born within fourteen weeks after the end
of the previous leave. Since expected birth dates are not observed in our data, we consider a birth to be realized
within the automatic renewal window if it occurs no later than four months after the end of the previous PL.
Work-exemptions for higher-order births are in place in countries where PL lasts long enough so that women
could give birth to a new child while being covered by a PL from a previous child. In Germany, job protection is
extended when a mother gives birth to a child within a current leave. The “speed premium” in Sweden grants
higher PL benefits to parents who have subsequent children within short sufficiently short intervals Also the PL
systems of the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Estonia feature renewal rules that are very similar to the Austrian
system.
5PL renewal makes mothers eligible for a maternity leave transfer that is 80 percent higher than the regular
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a government transfer. A mother eligible for PL in 1990 received a PL benefit of about 340
Euros per month (31% of gross median female earnings). Benefits are not means-tested and not
taxed implying a median net income replacement ratio of more than 40%. Single women (or
women with a low-income partner) are eligible for higher benefit levels (Sonderunterstu¨tzung).
Figure IA shows the time path of transfer income for a PL eligible women who has earned
thousand Euros per month during the quarter before birth. Maternity leave transfers amount
to thousand Euros for a period of about two months after birth.6 After maternity leave has
been exhausted, this mother has two options. Either she arranges care for her newborn child
and returns to her pre-birth job earning thousand Euros per month. This option is complicated
by the fact that the Austrian child care system for children under the age of three years is
rather limited. Alternatively, she can provide care for her newborn child and take up PL
earning 340 Euros per month until her child turns one year old. On her child’s first birthday,
she can decide to return to her pre-birth job, take up a new job, or continue to provide care
for her child. In the event that she gives birth to a new child before her previous child turns
15.5 months old, she has access to renewed leave (Figure IB). Any child born after that date
will be covered only if the mother has been working for at least twenty weeks prior to giving
birth to the new child.
In July 1990, a first PL reform increased the maximum duration of PL to two years and
was enacted on July 1, 1990.7 A further reform in 1996 introduced a change in PL duration
by introducing a one-partner PL maximum of eighteen months. Because Austrian fathers
effectively do not take up PL, the one-partner maximum removed the last six months of PL
that were added in 1990.8
PL transfer. The maternity leave transfer of mothers who work in between two births equals the average wage
in the three months prior to giving birth (the same as for a first birth). PL renewal leaves job protection
unchanged.
6Since maternity leave is initiated eight weeks prior to expected date of birth, the pre- and post-birth duration
of maternity leave varies.
7In December 1989, the PL system was changed from a ”maternity” to a ”parental” leave system, allowing
also for the father to go on PL. However, this is of no practical consequence. In 1990 fewer than 1% of fathers
took advantage of that possibility. A second change was that women in farm households and family businesses
as well as women who did not meet the employment requirements became eligible for a transfer equal to 50%
of regular PL benefits up until the child’s second birthday. This is of no importance in the present analysis
because we confine ourselves to study behavior of female dependent employees. Furthermore, the reform made
it possible to take part-time PL, either between a child’s first and second birthday (by both parents at the same
time) or between a child’s first and third birthday (only one parent or both parents alternating).
8Compared to the U.S. Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) the Austrian PL rules are very generous. The
FMLA grants twelve weeks of unpaid leave to employees in firms with more than fifty workers. Compared to
current OECD systems, the pre-1990 PL system was of average generosity. The rules were very similar to those
currently in place in Canada (twelve months PL, cash transfer 55 percent of previous earnings), Australia (twelve
months PL, unpaid) or the U.K.(eighteen weeks paid maternity leave, thirteen months unpaid PL). Austrian
post-1990 rules are more similar to those currently in place in continental Europe. The German system grants
three years of PL and a generous cash benefit (100 percent of prior earnings on maternity leave, 67 percent of
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2.2 Effects on fertility and work careers
Extending PL from one year to two years may affect future fertility for two different reasons:
(i) a longer PL duration for the current child facilitates access to automatically renewed PL
benefits for a new child; and (ii) a longer PL duration for the future child reduces directly the
cost of this child. Arguably, taking advantage of PL renewal is difficult when PL leave is short.
The one-year policy forces a mother who wants PL protection for the future child to conceive
a new child quite early after the birth of the previous child.9 The 1990 reform adds twelve
crucial months to the automatic renewal period. Thus, achieving automatic PL coverage for a
future child is easier under the two-year policy than under the one-year policy (Figure IB).10
In contrast to the 1990 PL extension, the 1996 PL reduction did not change the biological
feasibility of PL renewal. To become eligible without having to go back to work, a mother has
to give birth to a new child within 21.5 months.
Inducing mothers to give birth to a future child within the automatic renewal period, the
1990 PL extension is likely to change the spacing of births. Note, however, that any shock
inducing mothers to give birth to planned children earlier may translate into a long-run increase
in the total number of children. As fertility plans are realized earlier, shocks to partnerships,
health, etc. that are inducing parents to give up family plans in a one-year system have weaker
effects on fertility in a two-year system. 11
Extending PL may also affect higher-order fertility because it lowers the cost of having a
future child. Ceteris paribus, a two-year leave for the future child is more attractive than a
one-year leave. Thus, the 1990 reform is expected to increase the number of children born to
prior earnings for the first fourteen months of PL and a flat transfer thereafter). In France mothers get three
years of PL, 80 percent of prior earning for the first twelve months and a flat transfer thereafter. Also Sweden
and Norway offer long leaves and PL benefits replace a very large fraction of prior income.
Interestingly, the renewal option is not unique to the Austrian system. The Swedish “speed premium” shares
similarities as PL benefits are extended when an additional child is born within two years after the birth of a
previous child. The German system also grants the possibility of PL renewal with respect to job protection (but,
unlike in the Austrian system, PL benefits do not cease when a parent goes back to work). The PL systems of
the Czech Republic and Slovakia are almost identical to the Austrian system and have the PL renewal feature.
9To see this more clearly consider a woman who gives birth on September 1, 1988. She would be entitled
to PL through September 1, 1989. To qualify for PL renewal, with the 8-week pre-birth maternity leave and
the 6-week post-PL grace period, she would have to give birth by December 14, 1989. Note that this requires
conceiving a new child by March 1989, no later than 5.5 months after giving birth to the previous child implying
a space between births of at most 15.5 months.
10Under the two year policy, a woman who gives birth on September 1, 1990 qualifies for PL renewal if a
second child is conceived by March 1992, or 18 months subsequent to giving birth to the previous child.
11Notice that applying this argument to the 1996 PL reduction it is not clear whether this reform will lead
to more or less children. On the one hand, the 1996 reform requires a tighter space between births for mother
who take advantage of renewal. On the other hand, while the required space is biologically feasible it is shorter
than before and may induce some mothers to delay a planned birth. The first effect increases and the last effect
decreases the number of births.
8
women exposed to the new policy.
The second key aim of PL policies is to facilitate balancing family work and market work.
Changes in the duration of PL for the current child may affect mothers’ work careers in two
ways. Take-up of extended leaves delays return-to-work, lowers employment and lowers labor
earnings in the short run (0-36 months after the birth of the current child). Moreover, prolonged
career interruptions may also lead to deteriorating mothers’ post-birth careers in the long run
(37 to 120 months after birth of the current child). Changes in PL duration for the future child
are expected to affect short-run post-birth work careers only indirectly, i.e. via their effect on
births.
Austrian PL offers two distinct types of benefits. A flat transfer and job protection. Flat
transfers translate into strong differences in replacement rates. We therefore expect strong
heterogeneity in the responses to changes of PL between mothers with high earnings prior to
birth compared to mothers with low pre-birth earnings. Moreover, PL policies do not only
target costs associated with foregone current income but also costs associated with loss of
lifetime income following a job loss. A longer duration of job protection may be particularly
beneficial for mothers with firm-specific human capital or mothers who are on deferred payment
contracts. To shed light on this issue we compare women working in white collar occupations
to women in blue collar jobs. Arguably, job-specific human capital, internal labor market and
career concerns are more important in white collar jobs so the job-protection channel should
trigger stronger responses for white collar women than for blue collar women.
3 Data and empirical strategy
In this section we first discuss the available data. We then present the empirical strategies and
explain the assumptions under which we identify the causal effect of changes in PL duration
on fertility and labor market outcomes.
3.1 Data
Our empirical analysis is based on the Austrian Social Security Database (ASSD). This database
collects information relevant for old-age social security benefits. As these benefits depend on
individuals’ earnings and employment histories, the data collects information on work histories
for the universe of Austrian private sector employees. Furthermore, the data also contains
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information on exact dates of births. A disadvantage of the ASSD is partial recording of birth
histories. ASSD records all births that occur after a women’s first job in the private sector.
This means that we can precisely determine the relative parity of any birth but we cannot
determine any birth’s absolute parity.12
Our ASSD extract covers women giving birth to their first ASSD child in the years 1985,
1987, 1990, 1993, and 1996. We observe second child births, return-to-work, employment,
and earnings for these women until the year 2000 allowing us to analyze about ten years of a
women’s life for the 1990 reform and less than that for the 1996 reform. We focus on mothers
who are likely to be at parity one because this yields a comprehensive picture of how PL
changes in PL on this first child affects future fertility and work careers.13
We establish PL eligibility for these women by considering work careers two years prior to
giving birth to the first child. Note that measuring eligibility is complicated because a women’s
work career in the public sector is unobserved (but counts for PL eligibility) and because a
women’s parity is unobserved. Our eligibility indicator allocates a women into the PL eligible
group if she demonstrates any employment or has ever been eligible for unemployment benefits
in the two years prior to giving birth. Clearly, this definition of eligibility may give rise to miss-
classifying ineligible women into the eligible group, thus reducing take-up. More importantly,
this encompassing definition of eligibility allows identifying a group of ineligible women (who
neither worked nor received unemployment benefits in the two years before giving birth) who
do not go on to collect PL in our data. This finding makes us confident that we cleanly identify
the group of PL ineligible women – a group that is of importance in discussing the validity
of the empirical strategy measuring the effect of changing PL duration for the future child.
Furthermore, in line with demographic research, we restrict attention to women aged 15 to 45
years when giving birth to their first ASSD child.
The ASSD allows constructing a set of four key outcome measures. Information on the
date of birth of the second ASSD child allows measuring whether a mother gives birth to
12Partial recording of previous births implies that we cannot precisely determine the parity of a birth. To
make things precise, consider a working woman gives birth to a child at age thirty. If this woman is continuously
employed in the private sector, we know this birth is her first birth and all subsequent births are recorded in
the ASSD. However, if this woman entered the ASSD, say, at age 25 (e.g. because she was previously employed
in the public sector not covered by the ASSD) she could have could have given birth to children before entering
the ASSD. More generally, if we observe x previous births in the data, we know that any subsequent birth is of
parity x or higher.
13Our focus here is on mothers, even though fathers could in principle take up PL provisions too. There are
two reasons why we do not include fathers in our analysis. First, take-up by fathers is extremely low. Second,
our data does not provide information on the dates of birth of a father’s children. Hence, fathers’ reactions to
PL policies cannot be addressed in the present context.
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at least one additional child. Information on the date of return to work allows discussing
return-to-work decisions. Information on the women’s work and earnings career allow assessing
employment and earnings in the two years prior to giving birth and up to ten years after birth.
In the analysis below, we measure employment and earnings at a yearly frequency relative
to the birthday of the first child. The set of conditioning variables comprises information on
employment, unemployment, and earnings since entry into ASSD (either 1972 or time of entry
into the labor market) and on a women’s labor market position exactly one year prior to birth
(employed or unemployed, industry and region of employer, daily labor income white collar or
blue collar occupation).14
3.2 Empirical strategy
Our empirical strategy uses the 1990 and 1996 PL reforms to identify the effect of PL duration
for the current child and the effect of PL duration for the future child.
Table IA shows PL durations for the current and the future child for three cohorts of women
who gave birth to a first child at three different dates: July 1990, June 1990, and June 1987.15
July 1990 mothers are eligible for 24 months of PL for the current child and PL renewal takes
place when a future child is born within 27.5 months after the July 1990 birth. PL duration
is 24 months for any child born within three years. June 1990 mothers are eligible for twelve
months of PL for the current child and PL renewal is possible when a future child is born
within 15.5 months. PL duration is 24 months for any child born within three years. June
1987 mothers are eligible for twelve months of PL for the current child and any future child
born within 36 months. PL is automatically renewed if the future child is born within 15.5
months.
Identifying the current-child PL effect Is the current-child PL effect identified from a
comparison of June 1990 mothers with July 1990 mothers? These two groups differ in the
duration of the PL renewal period (and the associated PL duration for the first child) but
they have the same PL duration for a future child. The crucial identification issue is to what
extent mothers could have influenced the date of birth of the current child in anticipation
of the policy change. There are at least two reasons that lead us to believe that mothers
cannot have “timed” births. First, the conception of a child is an event that can not be
14The data does not have information on hours, education, marital status.
15Table IB displays the analogous cohorts for the 1996 reform.
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perfectly planned by parents. Second, even if parents could deterministically plan a birth,
self-selection requires that parents were informed of the July 1990 policy reform at the date
of conception. We performed a content analysis of the major Austrian newspapers to check
the information that potential parents had nine months before the June/July 1990 births, i.e.
in September/October 1989. The public discussion about the PL reform started in November
11, 1989, but the ruling coalition (social-democrats and conservatives) discussed until April 5,
1990 until it had designed a policy reform apt to find parliamentary approval. Since it was
not clear until three months prior to the policy change whether a PL reform will take place
and how it will be implemented, the June/July 1990 births were not influenced by anticipation
of the July 1990 PL reform. However, while anticipation of the PL reform at the date of
conception is unlikely, it is still possible that mothers could have influenced the timing of a
birth by postponing induced births or planned caesarean sections.16 We assess the presence of
such fine-tuning in two ways. First, analyzing the number of children born in June and July
1990, we do not find evidence of a spike in births on July 1, 1990. Second, because birth timing
is likely to be strongest right around the reform date, we assess the sensitivity of our results
by excluding births occurring one week before and one week after July 1, 1990.17
Because babies’ date of birth assigns extended PL and parents could not anticipate extended
leave, we can identify the current-child PL effect by comparing treated mothers giving birth (to
the current child) in July 1990 to control mothers giving birth in June 1990.18 While treatment
and control samples are selected over two successive months, we consider their fertility and
labor market outcomes over the following 36 months (short-run effect) and the following 120
months (long-run effects). Differences between treated and controls cannot be attributed to
differences in the environment. In fact, the treated and controls are facing different parental
leave incentives but practically identical economic condition following the June/July 1990 birth.
16Gans and Leigh (2006) show that the introduction of the Australian baby bonus on July 1, 2004 lead to
a significant increase in the number of births on that same day suggesting that parents postponed their birth
to ensure they were eligible for the bonus. Similarly, Dickert-Conlin and Chandra (1999) show that the U.S.
tax system creates an incentive give birth to a child at the 31st of December rather than at the 1st of January.
They find that the probability that a child is born in the last week of December, rather than the first week of
January, is positively correlated with tax benefits.
17Mothers could also have changed pre-birth work patterns in order to become eligible for extended leave.
Empirical evidence on pre-birth employment in Figure VC is not consistent with such qualification effects.
18This is essentially a regression discontinuity framework (RDD). Denote the treatment status of a mother
by D, where D = 1 if a mother has access to a two year leave, and D = 0 if a mother has access to a one year
leave. Eligibility to treatment is discontinuous function of the current child’s date of birth T . Denote by t is
the date when policy changes (July 1, 1990 change from 12-months to the 24-months policy; and July 1, 1996
for the change from the 24-months to the 18-months policy). Provided that lim²→0Pr(D = 1|T = t + ²) 6=
lim²→0Pr(D = 0|T = t − ²) our design satisfies the “fuzzy” RDD assumption (Hahn et al. 2001). Figure II is
consistent with this assumption being strongly satisfied.
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Identifying the future-child PL effect To identify the effect of PL duration on the future
child, we compare short- (0-36 months after birth) and medium-run (37-72 months after birth)
outcomes of June 1987 mothers to June 1990 mothers. Identification of the future-child PL
effect requires stronger assumptions than those needed to identify the current-child PL effect.
The central identifying assumption is that there are no substantial cohort- or time-effects that
pollute the comparison between June 1987 and June 1990. We propose three ways of assessing
the plausibility of this assumption. First, we analyze PL ineligible women as a control group
and check whether outcomes of June 1990 mothers follow a different trend than for June 1987
mothers finding no significant time trend. Clearly, this small control group is less than perfect
because it encompasses women with weak pre-birth labor market attachment. Second, we
study time and cohort trends for PL eligible mothers both before and after the 1990 reform.
Third, we also exploit the way PL rules change with time-since-first-birth. While differences
in PL rules between the treated and the control group exist during the first 36 months, the
same rules apply 37 to 72 months after birth. Thus, treated and control mothers should differ
in the period 0 to 36 months after birth but less so in the period 37-72 months after birth.
Finally, adding up the effect of extending current leave to the effect of extending future
leave allows estimating the total effect of PL duration and PL renewal. Arguably, this total
effect comes close to the effects generated by moving fully from a one-year to a two-year system
– an effect of prime policy interest.
4 Extending PL duration for the current child
This section discusses the effects of extending PL duration for the current child on fertility and
return-to-work behavior. The analysis proceed in three steps. We first document the fertility
effects of changing PL duration for the current child. Next, we turn to labor market responses.
And finally we assess the potential heterogeneity in the responses to the reform by groups that
differ in income and in broad occupation
4.1 The impact on fertility
The ASSD reports information on PL take-up. Focusing on PL eligible mothers of newborn
children, Figure II reports average PL take-up (including zeros) associated with a first child
born between June 1 and July 30, 1990. Results indicate that June 1990 mothers take up
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slightly more than nine months of the ten months (after two months of maternity leave)
of PL available to them. In contrast, average PL take-up by July 1990 mothers amounts
to 19 months, which is considerably higher than for any mother giving birth in June 1990.
Interestingly, average PL take-up is about 85 percent of the 22 months covered by PL after
the 1990 reform (after two months of maternity leave). This suggests that the second year of
leave is valued by the majority of eligible women.
Figure II suggests comparing treated mothers who give birth in July 1990 to control mothers
giving birth in June 1990. How informative is this contrast on the causal effect of extending
PL duration for the current child? Table II provides descriptive evidence on PL take-up by
years since birth as well as on key pre-birth characteristics. Treated and control mothers are
identical with respect to PL take-up in the first year after giving birth to their current child.
Both cohorts take up about 9.2 months out of the roughly ten months offered by the PL system.
Striking differences in PL take-up appear in the second year after birth. While treated mothers
spend about ten months on PL, control mothers spend less than one month on PL (with their
second child).
In contrast to PL take-up, both cohorts appear to be quite similar with respect to pre-
birth characteristics. Both groups show similar amounts of previous work and unemployment
experiences and previous average labor earnings. Also labor market status one year before the
1990 birth differs only slightly. While July 1990 mothers are significantly more likely to be
in the age bracket 30-34 year compared to June 1990 mothers, the overall age composition is
quite comparable. Almost 80 percent of all births occur in the age group 20-29 and about 13
percent at ages thirty and older.
Table II also indicates that there are substantially more births in July 1990 than in June
1990. Is this evidence for “birth timing”? We investigate this issue by analyzing the number
of births in June and July 1990 on a day-to-day basis, finding a steady increase but no dis-
continuity in the number of births on the 1st of July (not reported). Thus, comparing June
1990 mothers to July 1990 mothers, we find little evidence of seasonality in the composition
of cohorts but strong seasonality in the number of births.19
Figure III presents first evidence on the causal effect of extending PL for the current child
on the decision to have an additional child. The vertical axis measures the percentage of women
19Indeed, births in July exceed births in June in any given year of our sample period (1985, 1987, 1990, 1993,
1996). Nevertheless, we perform sensitivity tests comparing births that occur, respectively, in the first/second
half of June 1990 and the first/second half of July 1990 to assess the sensitivity of our results to short-run timing
of births.
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who gave birth to a second child within the 36 months following the 1990 birth. To smooth out
the noise in date of birth data, Figure III presents 15 day backward moving averages for June;
and 15 day forward moving averages for July. Results indicate that 32.2 out of 100 woman in
the control group give birth to an additional child within the 36 months. In contrast, almost
36.7 out of 100 women do so in the treated group. Thus, almost 5 out of 100 women tend to
give birth to an additional child in the treated cohort that do not do so in the control group.
The magnitude of this effect seems quite robust and varies only slightly over the particular
time window one adopts.
Table III discusses the validity of this result explaining the probability of giving birth to an
additional child within three years in the context of a linear probability model. Column “Base”
estimates a baseline difference in short-run higher order fertility of about 4.5 additional births
per hundred mothers. Column “Controls” includes information on age and pre-birth labor
market history to assess the sensitivity of the key result to composition of treated and control
group mothers. Results indicate that extended PL increases short-run fertility by 4.9 additional
children per hundred women. Moreover, estimates indicate that higher order fertility is lower
for older women and for employed women. Column “Half-Window” estimates the causal effect
of extended leave on births by reducing the width of the baseline window from thirty days to
fifteen days. Results suggest that about 5.4 children are born to hundred women with extended
leave that are not present under short leave. Anticipating extension of leave, mothers with
a strong desire to have two or more children might have timed the birth of their first child
to take place on or after July 1, 1990 (by postponing a planned caesarean section or delayed
inducement of a birth to July 1 or later). Column “Anticipation” excludes births taking place
one week before and one week after July 1, 1990. Excluding these observations leaves results
essentially unchanged, point estimates do even slightly increase. The last column of Table III
runs a placebo regression where we repeat the regression of column “Controls” using data on
mothers giving birth to their first ASSD child in June and July 1987. These two groups faced
identical PL rules and hence we should not seen any major differences between them. In fact,
the estimated treatment effect is insignificant and the point estimate very close to zero.
The empirical analysis has documented a short-run response of higher order fertility. Does
this short-run response persist in the long run? Contrasting June and July 1990 mothers,
Figure IV shows how extended leave for the first child affected higher-order fertility within
ten years following the 1990 birth. Figure IVA shows the second-child “hazard” rate, i.e. the
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likelihood that a woman gives birth to a second child t months after the 1990 birth conditional
on not giving birth to a second child before month t. The control group has a somewhat higher
second-child hazard rate between months twelve and sixteen, whereas the treated group has
a much higher hazard between month eighteen and month 28. The difference between the
two groups is largest during months 22 to 25, when the additional birth hazard is almost 3.5
percent for the treated group but less than 2 percent for the control group. After month 28
there are no major differences between the two groups. This pattern can be rationalized by
the PL rules. Recall that the rules grant renewal of PL to control group mothers giving birth
before month sixteen and to treated mothers giving birth before month 28. Figure IVA shows
that the additional-child hazard diverges strongest when PL renewal is possible to treated
mothers but impossible to control mothers.
Figure IVB shows the cumulative proportion of women with a second child by time since
the 1990 birth. Results indicate that the treated have a lower second-child probability before
month 22 but a higher one thereafter. Interestingly, the difference does not erode in the long
run. Even ten years after the 1990 birth, the second-child probability of July 1990 mothers
is still 3 percentage points higher than for June 1990 mothers. This suggests the increase in
fertility created by the PL renewal effect does not just affect the timing but also the total
number of children.20
Table IV provides an econometric assessment of both short-run and long-run fertility effects
using a linear probability model. The first row repeats the results of Table III on short-run
fertility. The second row shows the corresponding result for long-run fertility (birth of a second
child within 120 months). Column “Base” shows that the effect of extending PL for the child
born in 1990 leads to three additional children being born to hundred mothers within ten years.
Adding controls (column “Controls”) increases the treatment effect to 3.5 percentage points;
halving the estimation window and excluding births closer than seven days before and after
July 1, 1990 does not reverse the result. We conclude that extending PL for the current child
increases long-run fertility.21
20Note that June 1990 mothers might still catch up to July 1990 mothers after ten years or due to differential
third-child fertility. While our data provide a window that is, arguably, too short to provide a definitive
assessment of completed fertility, we believe that this is unlikely to happen. First, June and July 1990 mothers
face identical economic and political circumstances on the third child. Second, since only about 65 percent of
mothers give birth to two or more children, the third child treatment effect would have to reach an implausibly
large magnitude.
21While the effect estimated here seems large, our estimated short-run impact is similar in magnitude to the
found by Milligan (2005) for pro-natalist transfer policies in Quebec where, depending on the parity, parents
got a cash transfer up to 8000 CAD. Fertility of those eligible is estimated to have increased by 12% on average,
and by 25% for those eligible for the maximum benefit.
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Rows (3)–(5) in Table IV document the timing of excess fertility. Column “Base” in Table
IV shows that treated mothers reduce future-child fertility by 2.6 percentage points in the
period when both treated mothers and control mothers have access to automatic renewal,
i.e. between months zero and month sixteen (row (3)). Then, there is a strong increase in
fertility by 8.4 percentage points in the period when only treated mothers have access to
automatic renewal, i.e. months 17-28 (row (4)). Finally, treated mothers are slightly less likely
to give birth to a second child between month 29 and month 120 (row (5)). This is the period
when both groups do not have access to automatic renewal. In sum, our results suggest that
the short-run change in access to automatic renewal leads to long-run effects on higher-order
fertility.
The most likely explanation for the high persistence of fertility-effects are shocks (to health,
partnership, workplace, etc.) that may otherwise induce parents to revise their long-run plans.
We show that more generous PL induces parents to realize a planned birth earlier. This means
the same shocks that are inducing parents to change family plans in a one-year system no
longer affect family planning under a two-year system. This is why short-term gains in fertility
also persist in the long run.22
4.2 Labor market outcomes
PL rules address the problems of parents in reconciling work and child care. Hence these rules
also affect parents’ labor market outcomes. We now explore whether and to what extent
extending leave from one year to two years affects women’s labor market outcomes by focusing
on three different indicators. (i) Return-to-work measures the probability that a woman has
returned to work at least once after giving birth to her first child in June or July 1990 in
the short run (0-36 months after birth) and in the long run (0-120 months after birth). (ii)
Employment refers to the months worked per calendar year after birth in the short run (0-36
months after birth) and in the long run (37-120 months after birth). (iii) Earnings measures
average pay earned per calendar day after birth in the short run (0-36 months after birth) and
in the long run (37-120 months after birth). Note that both employment and earnings are set
22While it is true that some women are induced to have a birth within 28 months who would have waited and
then never conceived (for preference or biological reasons), there also appear to be some women who are induced
to wait beyond 16 months. To the extent that these women experience a negative shock, the net positive effects
on the other set of women would be offset. Since there is a positive net fertility effect, the data suggest that
any offsetting of this kind is not complete.
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to zero in periods where a women does not work and included in the empirical analysis.23
Figure VA compares the proportion of women returning to work within 36 months after a
birth in June and July 1990 by day of birth. Whereas about 62 out of 100 women return to
work three years after giving birth in June 1990, only about 52 out of 100 women do so after
giving birth in July 1990 with a strong discontinuity from June, 30 to July, 1. This suggests a
very strong causal impact of PL duration on short-run return-to-work behavior.
Figure VB compares the return-to-work profile during the 120 months following the 1990
birth. The figure clearly shows that the maximum length of PL has an extremely strong
impact on return-to-work behavior. About 10 percent of mothers return to work within two
months after giving birth (i.e. the end of maternity protection), the same for July 1990 and
June 1990 mothers. About 80 percent of the treated and 83 percent of the control mothers
exhaust the full PL duration. While a substantial fraction of both treated (20 percent) and
controls (25 percent) return to work exactly when PL has run out, the majority of women
(60 percent among the treated, 58 percent among controls) stay home after PL has lapsed.
Moreover, extended leave for the 1990 child seems to lower the fraction ever returning back
to work. Whereas 85 out of 100 women return to work at least once ten years after the 1990
birth, only 82 out of 100 treated women do so.
Figure VC explores the effects of extended leave on employment. Employment patterns of
women giving birth to their first child are strikingly asymmetric. Whereas paid work takes up
about 9-10 months per year pre-birth, time spent in the workplace is below 7 months in all
post-birth years. Interestingly, adverse PL effects on return-to-work do not translate into lower
employment rates. Whereas there is a clear short-run employment disadvantage of treated
mothers compared to control mothers in the second year after the 1990 birth, employment is
basically the same from the third year onwards. Return-to-work patterns can be reconciled
with employment results as follows. Women eligible to short parental leaves who are planning
a further child return to work in the short-run temporarily to gain access to a renewed parental
leave. In contrast, women eligible to long parental leaves can exploit the renewal option and do
not have to return. This behavioral pattern explains simultaneously the fact that the fraction
ever returning to work is lower in the treated group but long-run employment in months 37
23Return-to-work at date t measures the probability that a woman has stopped her baby break between
date 0 and date t. In contrast, employment counts the days at work work between date 0 and date t (set
to zero when a women does not work). Since a woman could have returned to work at some date s < t but
dropped out of workforce at some later date τ ∈ (s, t) the two indicators differ. Unconditional labor earnings are
average earnings per months and set to zero when a women does not work at all during the respective month.
Employment and earnings are available at an annual frequency.
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to 120 remains unchanged. Basically, extending parental leave reduces short-run temporary
return-to-work but does not affect longer-run labor supply decisions.
Figure VD displays the evolution of average labor earnings for the two groups. Again,
earnings patterns are strikingly asymmetric in periods covering a first child birth. Whereas
women earn about 33 Euros per calendar day before birth, mothers of newborn children earn
less than 30 Euros in all ten post-birth years. In terms of assessing the effects of extended PL
on earnings, Figure VD shows that pre-birth average earnings are identical between June and
July 1990 mothers but diverge strongly immediately after giving birth. Earnings are lower for
treated women in the first three years after the 1990 birth. From year four onwards, however,
treated mothers earn slightly more than control mothers. The positive medium-run earnings
effect of extended leave could be driven by various channels: participation in work, length
of work, selection into work, and a genuine behavioral effect (more hours, better jobs due to
promotions, etc.). Long run employment results (months 37-120) suggest that the joint effects
of participation and length of work are close to zero. There is also a small but insignificant
composition effect: women with high pre-birth wages return to job earlier with extended leave
than with short parental leave. This implies that the somewhat higher long-run earnings of
July 1990 mothers are due to a genuine behavioral effect. While this effect is small it seems
that those mothers who return after extended leaves work somewhat more and/or are employed
in relatively better paid jobs than mothers who return after shorter leaves.
Table V uses linear regression to assess the causal effects of the 1990 PL extension for the
current child on short- and long-run labor market outcomes. Columns “Base” to “Placebo”
assess the sensitivity of the results in the same way as the corresponding columns in Table IV on
short-run fertility. Treated mothers are significantly less likely to have returned to work three
years after giving birth to their first in July 1990 (row (1)) and the difference is quantitatively
large: An additional 10 out of 100 mothers have not returned to work within three years
after the 1990 birth. This difference in return-to-work shrinks over time but a significant 3
percentage point difference still remains even after 10 years (row (2)). Interestingly, while
treated mothers work about one month per year less during the first three years after giving
birth (row (3)), there are no long-run employment differences between treated and controls.
During months 37-120 after birth both groups’ average employment is the same for the two
groups (row (4)). A similar finding obtains for earnings per calendar month. Treated mothers
earn about three Euros less from working on the average day of the three first post-birth years
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(row (5)), there is even a positive albeit statistically insignificant earnings differential between
treated and control mothers four to ten years after giving birth (months 37-120; row (6)).
Thus, while the 1990 reform slightly reduced the number of women ever returning to work,
staying out of work for an extended period does not appear to harm employment and earnings
of treated mothers.
4.3 Heterogenous responses: income and occupation
Austrian PL provisions offer job protection and a financial transfer during the time a mother
stays off work. While both types of policies reduce the costs of having children they target
quite different dimensions of these costs. Cash transfers help extending the time a mother can
stay home with her baby without running into financial distress. This is more likely to help
low-income parents. In contrast, job protection extends the time a mother can spend with
her baby without losing the job. This is more likely to help career-oriented women for whom
job-loss may be very costly.
Table VI explores whether extending PL duration affects high and low-wage women differ-
ently. A mother is considered “Hi Wage” if daily earnings on the job held exactly one year
prior to giving birth (pre-birth job) exceeds the median of daily pre-birth earnings (37.12 Euros
per day worked); and a mother is considered “Lo Wage” otherwise. The flat rate transfer of
340 Euros translates into a low replacement rate for high-wage women and a high replacement
rate for low-wage women. Moreover, taking occupation as a proxy for the extent of job specific
skills, we also investigate whether the responses for women holding a white collar occupation
one year prior to birth (column “Wt Col”) were different from the responses of women holding
a blue collar job (column “Bl Col”).24 For comparison purposes, column “Base” repeats the
baseline result (column “Controls” of Tables IV and V).25
Results indicate that the 1990 PL reform lead to a significant increase in short-run fertility
for both high- and low-wage women (Table VI, columns “Hi Wage” and “Low Wage”). Excess
short-run fertility amounts to almost four children per 100 high-wage mothers and to almost
seven children per 100 low-wage women (row (1)). This result suggests that taking advantage
24Women who did not hold a job one year prior to giving birth to the 1990 child are allocated to the low
wage / blue collar categories, respectively. Results remain qualitatively unchanged if we exclude non-employed
women.
25Clearly, such rough sample splits along one dimension are likely to be contaminated by imbalanced along
other dimensions. For instance, 62% of high wage women hold a white collar occupation whereas only 44% of
all women hold a white collar occupation. Nevertheless, splitting the sample along these two dimensions allows
discussing the relevance of earnings replacement and value of job protection.
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of automatic renewal is less attractive to high-wage women than to low-wage women. Long-run
fertility effects disappear for women with high earnings power (1.6 percentage point difference)
but not for women whose pre-birth earnings power lies below the median (6.4 percentage point
difference). Rows (3)–(5) in Table VI assess the timing of fertility. High-wage women delay
fertility stronger than low-wage women up to month sixteen (when also control women have
access to automatic renewal, row (3)). From months 17 to 28 (when the treated have access
to automatic renewal but controls do not, row (4)), treated high- and low-wage women display
excess fertility of eight and nine children per 100 women, respectively. In the period following
month 29, high-wage (but not low-wage) controls have significantly higher fertility (row (5)).
In sum, excess fertility for low-wage women results from not delaying initial fertility by the
treated and from not catching up by the controls after automatic renewal has lapsed.
These differences in fertility timing are likely to be explained by differences in work attach-
ment between high-wage women (63% return to work within three years, row (6), number in
brackets) and low-wage women (only 50% return to work within three years, row (6), num-
ber in brackets). Since returning-to-work between children induces a wider space between first
birth and second birth, offering automatic renewal compresses the space between children more
strongly for the group with a larger ex-ante space between births.
Interestingly, while there are significant differences in fertility responses between high-
and low-wage women, the PL reform affects employment and earnings of high- and low-wage
women to a similar extent (Panel B in Table VI). The decrease in return-to-work probabilities
is somewhat smaller for high-wage women than for low-wage women in the short run but
almost identical in the long run (rows (6) and (7)). The reduction in employment is identical
for both groups in the short run and in the long run (rows (8) and (9)). Short-run earnings
reductions are stronger for high-wage women than for low-wage women (row (10)). However,
since employment responses are nearly identical, differential earnings responses arguably reflect
ex ante differences in earnings power rather than differential earnings consequences of extending
PL duration. There are no significant long-run earnings consequences of extended career
interruptions (row (11)).
Turning to fertility results by occupation reveals that both short-run and long-run fertility
responses are quite similar for white collar and blue collar women (columns “Wt Col” and
“Bl Col”, rows (1) and (2)): three additional children within 10 years. Yet even though the
long-run result is similar, the time pattern of the responses differs somewhat between white
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and blue collar women (rows (3)–(5)). Both blue collar women delay second child fertility in
the period giving both treated and control women access to automatic renewal (row (3)); both
blue and white collar women eligible for extended PL concentrate births of second children in
the period with access automatic renewal (row (4)). Yet white collar control women catch up
to treated women more strongly than blue collar control women in the post-renewal period
(row (5)). This pattern of results is, again, consistent with differential post-birth labor market
attachment between white (65% return to job within three years, row (6)) and blue collar
women (50% return to job within three years, row (6)).
While occupation does not appear to mediate fertility responses of extended leave strongly,
occupation is important for the labor market consequences of extended PL (Panel B in Table
VI). About fourteen out of 100 treated white collar women do not return back to work within
three years because of extended PL. In contrast, only nine out of 100 blue collar women delay
return-to-work in the short run (row (6)). Long-run return-to-work of blue collar women is not
affected whereas almost four out of 100 women in the white collar group do not return to work
within ten years (row (7)). Extended PL reduces employment and earnings more strongly for
white collar women than for blue collar women in the short run (rows (8) and (10)). However,
in the long run PL-induced career interruptions are not harmful (rows (9) and (11)). In sum,
the results suggest that labor market outcomes of white collar women are more sensitive to
extending PL.
We conclude from the finding of higher fertility responses for low-wage women than for
high-wage women suggests that cash-transfers (through their impact on replacement ratios)
are important determinants of fertility responses. Finding that there are no differences in
fertility responses between blue- and white collar workers suggests that the job protection
provisions are of importance for white collar women. White collar women have, on average,
higher incomes than blue collar women and, on the basis of their lower average replacement
ratios they should also react less strongly to the PL extension. It seems that lower replacement
ratio are compensated by the benefits of job protection. This interpretation is consistent with
the idea that internal labor markets and career concerns are more important for white collar
jobs but less relevant for blue collar workers.26
26Our results also relate to the existing literature on the trade-off between fertility and labor supply. In
contrast to our long-run results, Angrist and Evans (1998) find that U.S. women with two children worked less
than women with just one child in 1990. There are at least two reasons for the differences in our results. First,
Angrist and Evans’ (1998) do not condition on time since birth. Their finding of a reduction in labor for the
average mother could be consistent with a temporary reduction in labor supply in the short-run but no reduction
of labor supply in the long-run – the situation we document for Austria. Second, Austria and the U.S. differ in
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5 Extending PL duration for the future child
This section assesses the effect of extended leave of the future child (“future-child PL effect”).27
To identify this effect we compare the June 1990 cohort (eligible for a one-year PL for the
current child but to a two-year PL for the future child) to the June 1987 cohort (one-year PL
for the current child and one-year PL for any second child born within three years after first
birth).
The June 1990 to June 1987 contrast may be biased due to cohort effects and time trends.
Hence Table VII presents a range of supplementary analyzes that shed light on the plausi-
bility of the key identifying assumption of identical ex ante fertility plans and labor market
trajectories for two cohorts. Assessing the sensitivity of our results to time trends, we provide
(i) a placebo estimate of the reform among PL ineligible mothers (column “Ineligible”), (ii)
estimates of a three year post-reform time trend that compares July 1993 mothers to July 1990
mothers (column “Post-trend”), and (iii) estimates of a two-year pre-reform time trend that
compares June 1987 mothers to June 1985 mothers (column “Pre-trend”).28 Moreover, Table
VII distinguishes between months 0-36 after first birth (where second child duration differs)
and months 37-72 after first birth (where second child duration is identical).29
Results indicate that the future-child PL effect is quantitatively important (Table VII).
Short-run fertility is 7 percentage points higher for June 1990 mothers than for June 1987
mothers. (Panel A of Table VII, row (1)). Adding pre-birth characteristics does not change
this result. We do not find that PL ineligible June 1990 women tend to give birth to more
future children than PL ineligible June 1987 women (column “Ineligible”). We also do not find
a high importance of time-trends. Higher order fertility is similar between July 1993 and July
1990 mothers (column “Post-trend”) and is also similar between between June 1987 and June
terms of female labor force participation. In 1994, the earliest year with comparable OECD statistics, 65% of
American working-age women participated in the labor market whereas only 59% of Austrian women did. Since
these participation differences presumably reflect differences in the speed of post-birth labor market re-entry, a
second child is likely to crowd out more employment in the U.S. than in Austria. Thus, the fertility effects of
extended parental leave may come at higher long-run employment cost in countries with high post-birth labor
market participation.
27Note that, while the change in the PL system could in principle also affect first-child, third-child fertility,
... etc. we confine our analysis to the analysis of second-fertility because for this parity the effects should be
most pronounced.
28The pre-reform time trend can not be three years because our ASSD extract starts in 1985.
29Note that the inverse pattern of eligibility holds for the Pre- and post-reform trend cohorts. Pre-reform
cohorts are eligible for the same second child PL duration during months 0-36 after first birth, but PL duration
differs during months 37-72 after first birth. In the pre-reform time trend analysis, for instance, second children
of June 1987 mothers are eligible for 24 months of PL duration in months 37-60 after first birth, whereas second
children of June 1985 mothers are still only eligible for 12 months of PL duration. In months 61-72 after first
birth both second children of both cohorts are eligible for 24 months of PL duration.
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1985 mother (column “Pre-trend”).
Interestingly, extending leave for the future child does not appear to affect labor market
outcomes to an important extent (rows (2)–(4) of Panel A in Table VII). Return-to-work
and earnings do not display statistically significant effects (rows (2) and (4)). While work
experience is reduced significantly, estimates indicate that treated mothers work 0.2 months
per year less.30
Panel B in Table VII shows that the short-run fertility effect persists in the medium run.
Our results indicate that there is no significant catch-up of control mothers during months 36
to 72. While June 1990 mothers give birth to slightly fewer second children than June 1987
mothers, the effect is quite small (1.4 children per 100 women) and not statistically significant.
Furthermore, results on PL ineligible women are insignificant. The last two columns of Table
VII show time-trend results. More precisely, these results measure time trends plus future-
child differences in PL duration in the medium run. For instance, pre-trend estimates compare
June 1987 mothers who are covered by a two-year leave in the medium run (months 36 to 72
cover the period from July 1990 to June 1993) whereas June 1985 mothers are covered by a
one-year leave for the first two years and a two-year leave for the third year (months 36 to 72
cover the period from July 1988 to June 1991). Consistent with this pattern of PL eligibility,
the future-child PL effect is 3 percentage points higher for the June 1987 cohort than for the
June 1985 cohort.31 Post-trend estimates captures the fact that second child leave is reduced
from 24 months to 18 months for July 1993 mothers while July 1990 mothers still have access
to a two-year leave. Point estimates are quantitatively consistent with the future-child effects
estimated above, but are not statistically significant.
Except for a small increase in return-to-work, we do not find important future-child PL
effect on medium-run labor market outcomes.
What can we learn from the current child and future child effects? Recall that the current
child estimates compare families with different benefits (in terms of transfers and time for
care) on the current child but identical benefits for the future child. Abstracting from auto-
30Note that employment estimates could be spurious because there is a significantly negative post-reform
trend in employment (column ”Post-reform”, column (3), Table VII). Moreover, the coefficients on labor
market outcomes are very imprecise, so the data are consistent with zero effects, but also with large negative
effects on employment and earnings.
31The effect is about one half of short-run estimate in row (1), column “Controls” of Table VII. This lower
importance of extended leave on a future child can probably be explained by two facts. First, the pre-reform
control group of June 1985 mothers gets access to extended leave in the period 61 to 72 months after birth.
Second, mothers might be less responsive to extended leave three to six years after birth than zero to three
years after birth.
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matic renewal, extending parental leave should crowd out short-run post-birth labor market
participation but leave fertility decisions unaffected. In contrast, future child estimates com-
pare families with different benefits on the future child but identical benefits for the current
child. Extending parental leave should affect fertility decisions but not crowd out short-run
post-birth labor market participation.
Turning to results, we find that extending parental leave for the current child reduces short-
run post birth work experience by one month, whereas the corresponding future child effect
is about one fifth of a month. Thus, the pattern of labor market results is in line with the
pattern of incentives. In contrast, whereas extending parental leave for the future child boosts
short-run fertility by 7 percentage points, doing so for the current child also increases short-
run fertility by 5 percentage points. Thus, fertility results suggests that access to automatic
renewal is valuable; indeed almost as valuable as extended leave on a future child.
6 Reducing PL duration
This subsection discusses the effects of the 1996 reduction of PL. Results comparing mothers
giving birth to their first child in July 1996 (eligible for eighteen months of leave) to mothers
giving birth to their first child in June 1996 (eligible for 24 months of leave) indicate, first, that
the number of children born within three years is not affected by the partial reversal of the
1990 policy change (Table VIII, row (1)). Second, while the number of children is unaffected,
the timing of second child fertility is significantly altered. There is excess future-child fertility
of about 3 percent before month 22 (when both treated and control mothers have access to PL
renewal) and a decrease of the same order of magnitude during months 23-28 (when the treated
loose access to PL renewal; Table VIII, rows (2)–(4)). Reducing PL duration strongly affects
the timing of births but not the number of children being born because, arguably, mothers
can take advantage of PL renewal before and after the 1996 reform, whereas the 1990 reform
represents a switch from a system where PL renewal was not feasible to a system where it
become highly attractive.32
Third, reducing PL duration affects return-to-work, employment and earnings considerably.
In the short run, 5 out of 100 women return to work within three years who would not with
extended leave (Table VIII, row (5)). Women on the 18 month leave also work on average
32We also investigate the effects of reducing PL duration for the future child by comparing mothers who give
birth to a first child in June 1996 to mothers who give birth to a first child in June 1993. Findings indicate that
reduced leave on the future child is associated with a decrease in short-run fertility.
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about 0.7 months more per year and earn 3 Euros more per day more than women with access
to a two-year PL (Table VIII, rows (6) – (7)). Notice that the six month reduction in PL
duration affects return-to-work, employment, and earnings by about half as much (in absolute
value) as the 12 months extension of PL duration in 1990. Hence results for the 1996 reform
confirm that that PL duration for the current child has a strong impact on short-run labor
market outcomes.
7 Conclusions
The focus of this paper is to study the relevance of the duration of job protected, paid PL for
higher-order fertility and labor market outcomes of working women. The empirical analysis is
based on a 1990 extension of PL duration from one year to two years, and on a 1996 reduction
of PL from two years to eighteen months.
We find that extending PL affects fertility via two channels. First, increasing leave for
the current child opens up the possibility to renew PL benefits without going back to work.
The resulting tighter spacing of births gives rise to both excess short-run fertility (5 additional
children per 100 women within three years) and excess long-run fertility (3 additional children
per 100 women within ten years). Moreover, increasing leave for the future child reduces the
cost of care for that child inducing mothers to give birth to about 7 additional second children
per 100 women. This means that extending job protected paid PL with automatic renewal
from one year to two years induces mothers to give birth up to about 12 additional children
per 100 women. Regarding the labor market consequences of extended leave, we find that most
mothers exhaust the full duration of their leaves; that return-to-work is substantially delayed
even after PL has been exhausted; and that prolonging leave leads to significant short-run
reductions in employment and earnings but only minor effects in the long run. Fertility and
labor market responses are heterogeneous with respect to earnings and occupation on the pre-
birth job. This is consistent with both replacement rates and job protection mediating the
effects of extended leave on fertility and labor market responses. Finally, our findings indicate
that the 1996 reduction of PL duration compresses the space between first and second births,
but does not have a significant effect on the number of second children born within three
years. Moreover, the labor market responses closely mirror those of the 1990 extension of PL
duration.
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Providing causal evidence on how Austrian policy changes affect fertility and labor market
careers is interesting and important for the non-Austrian public. In many countries fertility
levels have fallen strongly and the question whether PL policies can help to increase fertility
is hotly debated. Our results show that such policies can have a quite strong impact; and that
both transfers and job protection matter for fertility responses. Our analysis of labor market
effects addresses the issue whether too generous PL rules might have a negative impact on
mothers’ subsequent work careers – an issue of paramount importance. We think the Austrian
case is interesting in this respect because the 1990 PL reform was a move from a system of
average generosity (by current OECD standards) to a system of high generosity. While we do
find that the PL-extension increases the proportion of women who never return to work, we
do not find detrimental effects on employment and earnings over an extended time horizon.
Hence we conclude that generous PL policies do not necessarily harm women’s long-run labor
market outcomes.
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Table I: Empirical Design
Parental leave Automatic Parental leave
Current child born current child renewal future child
(born within 36 months)
(A) 1990 reform
June 1987 12 months 15.5 months 12 months
June 1990 12 months 15.5 months 24 months
July 1990 24 months 27.5 months 24 months
(B) 1996 reform
June 1993 24 months 27.5 months 24 months
June 1996 24 months 27.5 months 18 months
July 1996 18 months 21.5 months 18 months
Source: Austrian Federal Laws, various years.
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Table II: Descriptive Statistics, Mothers Giving Birth in June and July 1990
July 1990 June 1990 Contrast
mean sd mean sd est se
(A) Treatment
Parental leave, yr 1 (mths) 9.208 (2.194) 9.196 (2.139) .012 (.055)
Parental leave, yr 2 (mths) 10.082 (3.486) .795 (2.209) 9.287 (.074)***
(B) Demographics
Age 20-24 .423 (.494) .443 (.497) -.02 (.013)
Age 25-29 .346 (.476) .343 (.475) .004 (.012)
Age 30-34 .109 (.311) .087 (.282) .022 (.008)***
Age 35-44 .029 (.167) .025 (.156) .004 (.004)
(C) Labor market history
Employment (years) 5.846 (3.94) 5.701 (3.792) .144 (.098)
Unemployment (years) .265 (.543) .257 (.484) .008 (.013)
Earnings not observed? (1=yes) .028 (.165) .026 (.16) .002 (.004)
Daily earnings (Euros) 34.49 (42.942) 33.313 (37.719) 1.178 (1.026)
(D) One year before birth
Employed (1=yes) .868 (.339) .867 (.339) .001 (.009)
White collar (1=yes) .435 (.496) .441 (.497) -.006 (.013)
Daily 1989 earnings (Euros) 36.826 (20.935) 36.142 (20.397) .684 (.526)
Observations 3225 2955
Notes: Mean and standard deviation (in parentheses) for women giving birth to their first child in
June 1-30 or July 1-30 1990. Labor market history covers the period Jan 1972 to date of birth in June
or July 1990. Labor earnings are unobserved for women coming from the public sector which is not
covered by ASSD. Daily earnings refer to real mean earnings measured in year 2000 Euros per day
worked – real total labor earnings divided by work experience. Daily 1989 earnings are earnings on the
pre-birth job measured in year 2000 Euros – the job held exactly one year before giving birth. Data
also contains information on region and industry of the pre-birth employer.
Source: ASSD, own calculations. Sample restricted to PL eligible women giving birth to a child in June
1-30 or July 1-30 of year 1990.
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Table III: The Three-Year Fertility Effect of Extending PL Duration for the Current
Child, July 1990 (24 Months PL) vs June 1990 (12 Months PL)
Base Controls Half-Window Anticipation Placebo
July 0.045 0.049 0.054 0.056 0.008
(0.012)*** (0.012)*** (0.017)*** (0.014)*** (0.011)
Age 20-24 0.045 0.035 0.042 0.012
(0.024)* (0.034) (0.027) (0.021)
Age 25-29 0.029 0.014 0.028 0.048
(0.028) (0.039) (0.031) (0.025)*
Age 30-34 -0.059 -0.073 -0.058 0.020
(0.033)* (0.046) (0.037) (0.033)
Age 35-44 -0.111 -0.116 -0.099 -0.125
(0.043)*** (0.062)* (0.049)** (0.034)***
Employment (years) 0.006 0.003 0.006 0.008
(0.006) (0.009) (0.007) (0.007)
Employment sq. -0.057 -0.048 -0.052 -0.104
(0.038) (0.054) (0.044) (0.046)**
Unemployment (years) 0.011 0.028 0.011 -0.020
(0.022) (0.034) (0.025) (0.028)
Unemployment sq. -1.793 -1.850 -1.783 1.065
(0.694)*** (1.202) (0.752)** (1.233)
Earnings unobserved -0.025 -0.038 -0.004 0.062
(0.045) (0.060) (0.051) (0.046)
Daily earnings (Euros) 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)**
Daily earnings sq. -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)***
Employed -0.111 -0.036 -0.121 -0.099
(0.050)** (0.075) (0.057)** (0.045)**
White collar -0.011 -0.031 -0.004 -0.005
(0.017) (0.024) (0.020) (0.016)
Daily 1989 earnings 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.002
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Daily 1989 earnings sq. -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Industry No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean of dependent variable .345 .345 .346 .345 .258
N 6180 6180 3045 4757 6151
Notes: Linear model of the probability of giving birth to a second child within three years of giving
birth to a first child in June / July 1990. Standard error in parentheses. *(**,***) denote significance
at the 10%(5%,1%) level respectively. Inference based on Huber-White standard errors. “Base”: July
(24 mths PL) vs June (12 mths PL). “Controls”: adds controls (Table II). “Half-Window”: June 16 -
July 15. “Anticipation”: June 1-23 and July 8-30. “Placebo”: June 1987 (12 mths PL) vs July 1987
(12 mths PL).
Source: ASSD, own calculations. Sample covers PL eligible women giving birth to their first child in
June 1-30 or July 1-30 the respective years.
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Table IV: Short-Run and Long-Run Fertility Effects of PL Duration for the Current
Child, July 1990 (24 Months PL) vs June 1990 (12 Months PL)
Base Controls Half-Window Anticipation Placebo
Additional birth 0-36 mths .045 .049 .054 .056 .008
(.012)*** (.012)*** (.017)*** (.014)*** (.011)
[.345] [.345] [.346] [.345] [.258]
Additional birth 0-120 mths .03 .035 .03 .048 -.006
(.012)** (.012)*** (.017)* (.014)*** (.012)
[.617] [.617] [.62] [.617] [.556]
Additional birth 0-16 mths -.027 -.026 -.029 -.023 -.006
(.006)*** (.006)*** (.009)*** (.007)*** (.006)
[.066] [.066] [.067] [.066] [.069]
Additional birth 17-28 mths .082 .084 .084 .09 .011
(.01)*** (.01)*** (.014)*** (.011)*** (.008)
[.193] [.193] [.195] [.194] [.123]
Additional birth 29-120 mths -.024 -.021 -.023 -.018 -.011
(.012)* (.012)* (.017) (.014) (.012)
[.36] [.36] [.359] [.359] [.366]
Observations 6180 6180 3045 4757 6151
Notes: This table reports the “July 1990” parameter estimate in a linear probability model comparing
post-birth fertility of mothers giving birth to their first child in June / July 1990. Standard error in
parentheses, mean of dependent variable in brackets. *(**,***) denote significance at the 10%(5%,1%)
level respectively. Inference based on Huber-White standard errors. “Base”: July (24 mths PL)
vs June (12 mths PL). “Controls”: adds controls (Table II). “Half-Window”: June 16 - July 15.
“Anticipation”: June 1-23 and July 8-30. “Placebo”: June 1987, 1-23 (12 mths PL) vs July 1987, 8-30
(12 mths PL).
Source: ASSD, own calculations. Sample: PL eligible women giving birth to their first child in June
1-30 (12 mths PL) or July 1-30 (24 mths PL) in the year 1990.
35
Table V: Labor Market Effects of PL Duration for the Current Child, July 1990 (24
Months PL) vs June 1990 (12 Months PL)
Base Controls Half-Window Anticipation Placebo
Return-to-work 0-36 mths -.109 -.11 -.109 -.105 .009
(.013)*** (.012)*** (.017)*** (.014)*** (.012)
[.564] [.564] [.567] [.561] [.619]
Return-to-work 0-120 mths -.03 -.027 -.046 -.023 .009
(.009)*** (.009)*** (.013)*** (.01)** (.009)
[.847] [.847] [.85] [.845] [.83]
Employment, 0-36 mths -.999 -1.02 -1.001 -1.031 -.051
(.073)*** (.071)*** (.1)*** (.081)*** (.083)
[2.185] [2.185] [2.194] [2.183] [2.908]
Employment, 37-120 mths .07 .074 .047 .09 -.09
(.111) (.109) (.155) (.124) (.111)
[5.136] [5.136] [5.202] [5.107] [4.889]
Earnings, 0-36 mths -2.739 -2.998 -3.156 -3.044 -.821
(.335)*** (.304)*** (.429)*** (.348)*** (.321)**
[10.159] [10.159] [10.223] [10.096] [12.155]
Earnings, 37-120 mths .852 .545 .195 .522 -.862
(.563) (.522) (.74) (.598) (.518)*
[20.759] [20.759] [21.014] [20.658] [19.39]
Observations 6180 6180 3045 4757 6150
Notes: This table reports the “July 1990” parameter estimate in a linear regression / linear probability
model comparing post-birth labor market outcomes of mothers giving birth to their first child in June
/ July 1990. Standard error in parentheses, mean of dependent variable in brackets. Employment
and earnings are set to zero for women who do not hold a job. Zeros are included in all our analyses.
*(**,***) denote significance at the 10%(5%,1%) level respectively. Inference based on Huber-White
standard errors. “Base”: July (24 mths PL) vs June (12 mths PL). “Controls”: adds controls (Table
II). “Half-Window”: June 16 - July 15. “Anticipation”: June 1-23 and July 8-30. “Placebo”: June
1987 (12 mths PL) vs July 1987 (12 mths PL).
Source: ASSD, own calculations. Sample: PL eligible women giving birth to their first child in June
1-30 (12 mths PL) or July 1-30 (24 mths PL) in the year 1990.
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Table VI: Heterogeneous Effects of PL Duration for the Current Child (1990 Reform)
All Hi Wage Lo Wage Wt Col Bl Col
(A) Fertility
Additional birth 0-36 mths .049 .036 .068 .055 .048
(.012)*** (.017)** (.017)*** (.018)*** (.016)***
[.345] [.351] [.339] [.349] [.342]
Additional birth 0-120 mths .035 .016 .054 .034 .036
(.012)*** (.017) (.017)*** (.018)* (.016)**
[.617] [.616] [.618] [.611] [.622]
Additional birth 0-16 mths -.026 -.033 -.018 -.018 -.031
(.006)*** (.009)*** (.009)* (.009)** (.009)***
[.066] [.06] [.071] [.058] [.072]
Additional birth 17-28 mths .084 .08 .089 .095 .078
(.01)*** (.014)*** (.014)*** (.015)*** (.013)***
[.193] [.203] [.183] [.206] [.183]
Additional birth 29-120 mths -.021 -.031 -.013 -.042 -.008
(.012)* (.017)* (.017) (.018)** (.016)
[.36] [.353] [.366] [.348] [.369]
(B) Labor Market Outcomes
Return-to-work 0-36 mths -.11 -.103 -.124 -.137 -.094
(.012)*** (.017)*** (.018)*** (.018)*** (.017)***
[.564] [.632] [.496] [.647] [.5]
Return-to-work 0-120 mths -.027 -.028 -.029 -.039 -.018
(.009)*** (.012)** (.014)** (.012)*** (.013)
[.847] [.874] [.82] [.889] [.814]
Employment, 0-36 mths -1.023 -1.186 -1.15 -1.054 -.556
(.114)*** (.101)*** (.114)*** (.102)*** (.172)***
[2.594] [1.984] [2.659] [1.913] [1.505]
Employment, 37-120 mths .2 -.125 .071 .026 .238
(.173) (.162) (.171) (.163) (.286)
[5.88] [4.762] [5.95] [4.681] [3.92]
Earnings, 0-36 mths -3.548 -2.7 -3.914 -2.347 -2.356
(.56)*** (.354)*** (.564)*** (.335)*** (.748)***
[14.247] [7.183] [13.921] [7.454] [6.508]
Earnings, 37-120 mths 1.142 .311 .45 .895 -.403
(.927) (.64) (.923) (.614) (1.465)
[26.467] [16.139] [26.336] [16.183] [17.179]
Observations 6180 3087 3093 2705 3475
Notes: This table reports the “July 1990” parameter estimate in linear regressions / linear probability
models comparing post-birth labor market outcomes of mothers giving birth to their first child in June
/ July 1990. Standard error in parentheses, mean of dependent variable in brackets. Employment
and earnings are set to zero for women who do not hold a job. Zeros are included in all our analyses.
*(**,***) denote significance at the 10%(5%,1%) level respectively. Inference based on Huber-White
standard errors. “All”: repeats column 2 of Table 4 and column 2 of Table 5 for comparison. “Hi/Lo
Wage”: median splits for pre-birth daily income; “Wt/Bl Col”: splits by white and blue collar
occupation; wage and occupation measured one year prior to birth; women who are not employed one
year prior to birth are allocated to the low wage, blue collar category -respectively.
Source: ASSD, own calculations. Sample covers women giving birth to their first child in June 1-30 (12
mths PL) or July 1-30 (24 mths PL) in the year 1990.
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Table VII: The Effect of PL Duration for the Future Child (1990 Reform)
Base Controls Ineligible Post-trend Pre-trend
(A) Short-run effects (0-36 mths after birth)
Additional birth .069 .068 -.019 -.006 .001
(.012)*** (.012)*** (.051) (.012) (.011)
[.286] [.286] [.236] [.364] [.25]
Return-to-work -.002 -.003 -.053 .008 .018
(.013) (.012) (.038) (.012) (.012)
[.622] [.622] [.135] [.524] [.614]
Employment -.183 -.164 -.336 -.103 -.045
(.084)** (.083)** (.216) (.058)* (.086)
[2.799] [2.799] [.583] [1.71] [2.909]
Earnings -.181 -.229 .512 -.75 -.589
(.361) (.331) (1.927) (.282)*** (.325)*
[11.68] [11.68] [9.031] [8.974] [11.849]
(B) Medium-run effects (37-72 mths after birth)
Additional birth -.019 -.014 -.072 -.011 .033
(.011)* (.011) (.047) (.01) (.011)***
[.21] [.21] [.182] [.179] [.205]
Return-to-work .028 .024 .011 .022 .005
(.009)*** (.01)** (.043) (.011)** (.009)
[.158] [.158] [.156] [.227] [.144]
Employment -.172 -.191 -.492 .315 -.007
(.123) (.122) (.397) (.117)*** (.125)
[4.585] [4.585] [1.599] [4.77] [4.688]
Earnings -.13 -.325 -.252 .441 .053
(.547) (.523) (2.285) (.524) (.498)
[17.015] [17.015] [13.084] [18.654] [16.814]
Observations 5977 5977 274 6406 5892
Notes: This table reports the “After” parameter estimate in linear regressions / linear probability
models comparing post-birth labor market outcomes of mothers giving birth to their first child in
June or July of various years. Standard error in parentheses, mean of dependent variable in brackets.
Employment and earnings are set to zero for women who do not hold a job. Zeros are included in all
our analyses. *(**,***) denote significance at the 10%(5%,1%) level respectively. Inference based on
Huber-White standard errors. “Base”: eligible, June 1990 (24 mths PL for second child, 12 mths PL
for first child) and June 1987 (12 mths PL for first and second child). “Controls”: adds controls (Table
II) to “Base”. “Ineligible”: ineligible with controls, June 1990 vs June 1987. “Post-trend”: eligible
with controls, June 1993 vs July 1990. “Pre-trend”: eligible with controls, June 1987 vs June 1985.
Source: ASSD, own calculations. Sample covers eligible and ineligible women giving birth to their first
child in June or July of the years listed in the notes.
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Table VIII: The Effects Of Reducing PL Duration for the Current Child (1996 Re-
form)
June 1996 (24 Months PL) vs July 1996 (18 Months PL)
Base Controls Half-Window Anticipation Placebo
(A) Fertility
Additional birth 0-36 mths -.003 -.001 -.025 .003 -.021
(.012) (.012) (.017) (.014) (.012)*
[.321] [.321] [.331] [.309] [.349]
Additional birth 0-22 mths .028 .028 .023 .022 -.021
(.009)*** (.009)*** (.013)* (.01)** (.009)**
[.152] [.152] [.157] [.148] [.151]
Additional birth 23-28 mths -.03 -.029 -.032 -.028 .001
(.008)*** (.008)*** (.011)*** (.009)*** (.008)
[.103] [.103] [.109] [.098] [.122]
Additional birth 29-36 mths .004 .005 -.013 .013 -.003
(.007) (.007) (.01) (.008)* (.007)
[.077] [.077] [.076] [.076] [.084]
(B) Labor market outcomes
Return-to-work 0-36 mths .051 .053 .058 .047 .003
(.012)*** (.012)*** (.017)*** (.014)*** (.012)
[.661] [.661] [.66] [.663] [.536]
Employment 0-36 mths .675 .684 .703 .676 .057
(.069)*** (.067)*** (.095)*** (.076)*** (.056)
[2.456] [2.456] [2.46] [2.487] [1.729]
Earnings 0-36 mths 2.65 2.697 2.295 3.045 -.267
(.367)*** (.321)*** (.444)*** (.371)*** (.264)
[12.302] [12.302] [12.148] [12.469] [9.135]
Notes: This table reports the “July 1996” parameter estimate in linear regressions / linear probability
models comparing outcomes of mothers giving birth to their first child in June / July 1996. Standard
error in parentheses, mean of dependent variable in brackets. Employment and earnings are set to zero
for women who do not hold a job. Zeros are included in all our analyses. *(**,***) denote significance
at the 10%(5%,1%) level respectively. Inference based on Huber-White standard errors. “Base”: July
(18 mths PL) vs June (24 mths PL). “Controls”: adds controls (Table II). “Half-Window”: June 16 -
July 15. “Anticipation”: June 1-23 and July 8-30. “Placebo”: June 1993 (24 mths PL) vs July 1993
(24 mths PL).
Source: ASSD, own calculations. Sample: PL eligible women giving birth to their first child in June
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Figure I: PL Benefits and Work Requirement for Higher-Order Births
Notes: Figure shows the benefit path for a women earning real 1000 Euros per month before giving
birth to her first child (A) and the number of weeks she needs to work for parental leave to cover
the subsequent child (B). The parental leave benefit is 340 Euros per month irrespective of pre-birth
monthly income. Dotted line refers to the situation before July 1990, solid line refers to the situation
between July 1990 and June 1996, and dashed line refers to the post July 1996 rules.
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Figure II: Parental Leave Take-Up for the Current Child
Notes: Figure plots average (mean) months of parental leave taken, including the zeros.
Source: ASSD, own calculations. Sample restricted to PL eligible women giving birth to a child in June
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Figure III: How Does Parental Leave Affect Higher-Order Fertility?
Notes: Figure reports the percentage of women who gave birth to at least one additional child within
3 years after giving birth in June or July 1990. June smoothed backwards, July smoothed forward (15
day moving average).
Source: ASSD, own calculations. Sample restricted to PL eligible women giving birth to a child in June
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Figure IV: Additional Births (“Hazard” and Cumulative Proportion), July 1990
(24 Months PL) vs June 1990 (12 Months PL)
Notes: Figure reports the additional child “hazard”, i.e. the women giving birth to an additional child
in month t as a proportion of those who have not given birth to an additional child up to month t (A)
and the cumulative proportion of women giving birth to at least one additional child up to month t
(B). Vertical bars indicate end of automatic renewal (dashed for June 1990 mothers, regular for July
1990 mothers).
Source: ASSD, own calculations. Sample restricted to PL eligible women giving birth to a child in June
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Figure V: Return-to-Work, Employment and Labor Earnings, June 1990 vs July 1990
Notes: Panel A reports the percentage of women who have returned to work at least once within
three years after the 1990 birth (June smoothed backwards, July smoothed forward, fifteen day moving
average); Panel B reports the cumulative proportion of women who have returned to work at least once
since the 1990 birth; Panel C reports average months in employment and Panel D. reports mean labor
earnings per calendar day since the 1990 birth. (Panels C and D are drawn on an annual frequency;
data points at six, eighteen, etc. months refer to the first, second, etc. year after the 1990 birth.)
Employment and earnings are set to zero for women who do not hold a job. Zeros are included in all
our analyses.
Source: ASSD, own calculations. Sample restricted to PL eligible women giving birth to a child in June
1-30 or July 1-30 of year 1990.
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